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We advocate that antibiotic resistance be reframed as a disaster risk management
problem. Antibiotic-resistant infections represent a risk to life as significant as other
commonly occurring natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes). Despite efforts by global health
authorities, antibiotic resistance continues to escalate. Therefore, new approaches and
expertise are needed to manage the issue. In this perspective we: (1) make a call for
the emergency management community to recognize the antibiotic resistance risk and
join in addressing this problem; (2) suggest using the risk management process to help
tackle antibiotic resistance; (3) show why this approach has value and why it is different
to existing approaches; and (4) identify public perception of antibiotic resistance as an
important issue that warrants exploration.
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The Disaster of Antibiotic Resistance
On the 1st May 2014 the World Health Organization (WHO) (World Health Organization, 2014)
in its first global assessment of antimicrobial resistance reported that antibiotic resistance has
reached alarming proportions. It is no longer a future problem but a contemporary reality. This
statement reinforces decades of calls for action from scientists, clinicians, and leading authorities as
well as contemporary authorities such as the Deputy Director of the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) who stated we have reached the “end of the antibiotic-era” and the UK Chief Medical
Officer, Professor Dame Sally Davies who called for antibiotic resistance to be placed on the UK
National Disaster Risk Register ahead of terrorism. Significantly, following Professor Dame Sally’s
call, antimicrobial resistance was listed on the UK National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies. The
Register estimates that up to 80,000 people could die from a single antimicrobial-resistant outbreak
(UK Cabinet Office, 2015). The tone of the language used by these individuals and organizations
to describe the crisis of antibiotic resistance is frightening. It is also reminiscent of that used by
emergency managers to describe the unfolding processes of drought and global climate change and
commonly occurring disasters such as earthquakes, floods and storms.
A disaster is defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society,
involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources” (United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2009). Antibiotic-resistant infections are rising fast and
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affect millions of people globally, disrupting the functioning
of societies and outpacing the coping capacity of existing
health and medical communities. Consequently, we contend
that antibiotic resistance has become a slow-onset disaster
that, like climate change, has struggled to elicit the sort of
coordinated international response that is required to deal
with a crisis of this scale (Woolhouse and Farrar, 2014).
Anthropogenic modification of the Earth’s climate system leading
to slow-onset climate change provides the foundation for
sudden-onset natural disasters such as hurricanes and storms
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). Likewise,
increasingly widespread slow-onset antibiotic resistance lays the
foundation for the future occurrence of sudden-onset bacterial
epidemic and pandemic disasters. Significantly, antibiotic
resistance has not been recognized by emergency management
authorities as a major risk to life generally, or as a factor that
will contribute to the severity of future bacterial epidemics
and pandemics. This is despite the fact that antibiotics are
one of the key tools used to respond to epidemic and
pandemic outbreaks (World Health Organization: Regional
office for the Western Pacific, 2011). However, sudden-onset
antibiotic-resistant infectious outbreaks do already occur in
hospitals, nursing homes and other settings affecting the most
vulnerable and offering insights into what a future antibiotic-
resistant epidemic or pandemic outbreak might look like.
These outbreaks require costly interventions. For example, in
the United States, more than 2 million people are affected
by antibiotic-resistant infections per year with at least 23,000
annual deaths. Notwithstanding the extraordinary human loss,
this equals US$20 billion in extra healthcare costs and US$35
billion in lost productivity (Center for Disease Control, 2013).
In Australia, it is estimated that antimicrobial resistance costs
the health care budget AU$250 million per annum and costs the
community as much as AU$500 million per year (Shaban et al.,
2013). Interestingly, when focusing just on loss of human life
associated with high profile natural disaster events in different
parts of the world that resulted in significant risk management
policy and practice changes, antibiotic-resistant infections are
taking many more lives. For example, Hurricane Katrina in 2005
in the USA took over 1800 lives and the Black Saturday Bushfires
in Australia took 178 lives.
Humanity has become highly dependent on antibiotics.
They are utilized to help people combat bacterial infections,
to prevent bacterial infection in high-risk individuals such
as those undergoing invasive surgical procedures, to increase
food output in agriculture and to prevent infectious outbreaks
following natural disasters. In the past, the emergence of
antibiotic resistance was circumvented by the development of
new antibiotics that helped maintain our coping capacity. As
such, resistance was not really an issue. Unfortunately, drug
discovery and development is expensive and it is estimated
that ∼US$1 billion is spent before a drug even reaches the
market, hence this approach has stalled due to various economic
and regulatory constraints (Power, 2006). Due to the rate at
which bacteria can become resistant, a pharmaceutical company
may only achieve as little as 1–2 years revenue before drug
effectiveness in clinical medicine begins to diminish (Power,
2006). Furthermore, courses of treatment are short, typically 1
week, so the capacity to generate profit is modest. Consequently,
humanity faces a situation where the existing antibiotics are
losing their effectiveness and there is a dearth of new antibiotics
coming onto the market. Although research into new drugs (Ling
et al., 2015), alternative therapies such as honey for treating
wounds (Lu et al., 2013), herbal remedies (Tiwari et al., 2015), and
nanomaterials (Tiwari et al., 2014) all show promise, it appears
that society’s current ability to cope with the problem has reached
its limit and further resources are needed.
Much has been said about the reasons for the evolution
of antibiotic resistance, which is highly complex and
multidimensional. However, in its most basic form, antibiotic
use leads to antibiotic resistance (for a review on the evolution
of antibiotic resistance see Michael et al., 2014). Widespread
use, overuse and misuse of antibiotics in multiple settings,
including human medicine and agriculture, have created
strong selection pressures in favor of those bacteria that resist
antibiotics. Consequently, resistant bacteria are increasingly
found directly on or in humans and our companion animals,
farm animals, seafood, fruit, vegetables and in the natural
environment (Baquero et al., 2008; Kemper, 2008; Wright,
2010; Nesme et al., 2014). Apart from developing resistance via
genetic mutation (Maharjan et al., 2006; Beardmore et al., 2011),
spread of resistance to pathogenic bacteria can also occur via a
combination of two processes. Firstly, bacteria efficiently acquire
resistance genes from other bacteria i.e., lateral gene transfer
(Labbate et al., 2009). Secondly, through the consumption of
food or direct contact with people or environments containing
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, normal healthy bacteria in and
on humans acquire resistance which can then pass on to
disease-causing bacteria during an infection (van Hal et al.,
2009).
To date, responsibility for responding to the risk associated
with antibiotic resistance has fallen to the health and medical
industries. Globally, these experts have done a tremendous job
in attempting to manage this issue. Given the scale of the
crisis, extensive resources have been invested into “top-down”
antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) programs, thereby addressing
this issue from a “service” model perspective more akin to disease
management or quality improvement processes (Center for
Disease Control, 2014). The range of the activities falling under
this AMS umbrella are diverse, although mostly implemented
within hospital settings in higher-income countries, and have
been evaluated using various outcome and process measures
(Looke and Duguid, 2011; Hahn and Doby, 2013). Despite this,
it is recognized that antimicrobial resistance persists, as does the
over-utilization of antimicrobials (Laxminarayan et al., 2013).
Therefore, looking at the problem from different perspectives
may be of value. Critically, for the health and medical industries,
dealing with antibiotic resistance is surpassing their capacity
to contain and manage the problem. The distinctive shift in
the tone of the language used by the WHO to that of disaster
risk management presents an opportunity to take just such a
new perspective. Consequently, we propose rebranding antibiotic
resistance as a disaster risk management problem and argue
that the methods used to support communities in preparation
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for disasters may be applied to supporting communities prepare
for the risk associated with increasing levels of antibiotic
resistance.
Since the slow-onset emergence of antibiotic resistance
forms the foundation and trigger for an inevitable sudden-
onset epidemic or pandemic disaster, disaster risk management
provides a novel way of thinking about responding to the risk
now. It provides a useful process and set of tools to engage with
the general public and other stakeholders in order to prepare for
and manage the risk of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections
generally, and bacterial epidemics and pandemics specifically.
This is because the public is, in a sense, already primed to the
value of disaster risk management. By analogy, if thousands of
people were dying each year in slow-onset disasters like droughts
or rapid-onset disasters like bushfires, floods or hurricanes, this
would be considered a very serious “disaster risk management
problem.” Bacteria are biological risks to life and as such they
fit within the domain of disaster risk management. Given that
tens of thousands of people are dying each year due to the
acquisition of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections (European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control/European Medicines
Agency, 2009; Center for Disease Control, 2013), the implications
for the field of disaster risk management become obvious. That
is: (1) antibiotic and antimicrobial resistance is a risk to life;
(2) fatalities are already unacceptably high; (3) the placement
of antibiotic resistance on the national risk register triggers the
need for an emergencymanagement response; and (4) emergency
managers have the skills, tools and experience to engage with
communities to reduce the risk (e.g., via supporting positive
behavioral change).
The Emergency Risk Management Process
Disasters take lives, impact individuals, families and
communities, cause devastation and disrupt our socio-economic
and ecological systems (Adger et al., 2005). Around the world,
legislation directs emergency management authorities at national
and local levels to develop “disaster risk registers” that identify
risks that threaten society. Subsequently, those authorities must
then develop emergency management and response plans for
each identified risk to prepare for, and respond to, emergencies
and disasters using the “Emergency Risk Management Process.”
Sudden-onset bacterial epidemics and pandemics already fall
under the Emergency Risk Management Process (ERMP)
because they are biological risks to life. Here we call for antibiotic
resistance to be placed on national risk registers everywhere
as has been done in the UK. This would automatically raise
the profile of the problem and force response plans using the
ERMP.
It makes sense that emergency management participate in
addressing this problem as antibiotic resistance already affects
their capacity to manage disasters. For example, one of the major
tools used by Health Emergency Managers (e.g., the NSW State
Health Emergency Management Unit in Australia) to manage
the risk associated with bacterial epidemics and pandemics is
antibiotics (World Health Organization: Regional office for the
Western Pacific, 2011). The emergence of antibiotic resistance
means that the capacity of government authorities to manage the
risk is seriously compromised, particularly in poorly resourced
settings where access to services is limited and where reductions
in mortality have historically been dependent on antibiotics
alone (Okeke et al., 2005). This also includes bacterial infectious
epidemics that come off the back of a primary disaster such as an
earthquake (e.g., the 2010 Haiti earthquake) or another infectious
outbreak such as viral influenza leading to secondary bacterial
pneumonial infections. In fact, secondary bacterial pneumonial
infections have been suggested as the main reason for the 50–100
million deaths during the 1918 spanish flu pandemic (Brundage
and Shanks, 2008).
The ERMP is described as being integral to management
and decision-making, integrated into practices and culture and
tailored to a specific community’s risk profile. It is a systematic
method for identifying, analyzing, evaluating and treating risks
and takes an iterative approach with well-defined activities that
lead to implementation of risk-treatment strategies (Figure 1).
The process entails (1) establishing the context, (2) identifying
the risks, (3) analyzing the risks, (4) evaluating the risks, and
(5) treating the risks. This 5-step process is supported by
two enabling activities—communicating and consulting, and
monitoring and reviewing (The Australian Government, 2010).
“Risk Assessment” comprises the identification, analysis and
evaluation of the risk components of the ERMP, and must
be undertaken alongside “communication and consultation”
with all stakeholders. Indeed, the antibiotic resistance problem
is made up of multiple stakeholders (Table 1), existing in a
complex network that is not fully understood, but who must
all be consulted to ensure that any inroads made in one area
are not circumvented through alternative actions. For example,
patients prevented from acquiring antibiotics by improved AMS
programs may self-source them from internet pharmacies or
hoard antibiotics acquired through prescription (Michael et al.,
2014). To show the value of the ERMP, the following section will
focus on the general public as a specific stakeholder.
How Is the ERMP Different from Other Risk
Management Strategies Used in
Addressing Antibiotic Resistance?
The most recent WHO and CDC reports (Center for
Disease Control, 2013; World Health Organization, 2014)
on antimicrobial resistance outlined a series of action items
indicating that a “top-down” approach to risk management had
been utilized—that is, that solutions “for the community” are
largely being directed from above rather than being “developed
in consultation” (i.e., fromwithin) with target stakeholder groups
or communities. For example, AMS programs are a top-down
approach to managing antibiotic resistance to which extensive
resources have been allocated. The ERMP is a “bottom-up”
approach that identifies solutions to a risk problem tailored to a
specific community in consultation with that community. This
is an important point of difference because solutions developed
for one community are not necessarily appropriate to translate
to another. Also, “outsiders” that do not understand how a
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FIGURE 1 | The emergency risk management process. In the context of reframing antibiotic resistance as a disaster risk management problem, all
stakeholders are identified in the “Establish the context” stage. An indicative list of stakeholders is shown in Table 1. The identifying, analyzing, evaluating and
treating risk stages are undertaken via communication and consultation with stakeholders and monitoring and reviewing by the assessment team. This
“bottom-up” approach leads to more successful policy outcomes by establishing solutions consistent with the socio-cultural context of the stakeholders. Modified
from The Australian Government (2010).
TABLE 1 | Representative list of stakeholders and their potential role(s) in antibiotic-resistance.
Stakeholder Role(s)
Public/Community User of antibiotics for human health; At risk from antibiotic-resistant infections; Demand for cheap meat from food industry
Prescribers Prescriber of antibiotics to patients/public
Pharmacists Supply of antibiotics; Educating the public regarding proper antibiotic; Drug utilization evaluation; Medication review and
therapeutic adjustment
Food industry (Agriculture and distribution) Use of antibiotics in agriculture; Demand by distributors to provide cheap meat
Wastewater management Treatment of wastewater containing antibiotics; Non-removal of antibiotics from wastewater allows entry into the
environment facilitating resistance
Pharmaceutical companies Manufacture of antibiotics; Drug discovery; Marketing of antibiotic use to various stakeholders
NGOs/Community groups/Lobby groups Education, influencing or lobbying various stakeholders (e.g., anti-vaccination lobby or National Prescribing Service)
Government Policy development and regulation and control
Scientific researchers Research into new drugs, vaccines etc.; Evidence for driving policy and education
Research funding bodies Funding research for antibiotic resistance
Media Mass education and influence of public
stakeholder group functions, or the socio-cultural and behavioral
practices that establish the context for community behavior and
decision making may impose, all be it well meaning, regulations
and practices, that are completely intolerable to the target
stakeholder group.
For example, northern Australia is regularly affected by
tropical cyclones. Small remote communities comprising
dominantly of Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander people are
spread out over wide areas. In recent years as tropical cyclones
have approached and emergency management authorities
made the decision to evacuate people from these remote
communities by plane, actual emergency management officials
on the ground found themselves having to account for significant
cultural differences between the white Australian population
and the Indigenous peoples living in those places. Specifically,
Indigenous communities have complex governance structures
and cultural relations within and between kinship groups.
The initially “top-down” approach of emergency management
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simply saw everyone as the same and wanted (intensions were
well meaning here) to get everybody on to the aircraft and
safely away as quickly as possible. However, for the Indigenous
people, complex socio-cultural relationships meant that it was
not possible for “this person” and “that person” to be sat next
to each other openly in the small space of an aircraft interior.
This would “poison” relationships within the community that
would have long lasting and devastating impacts. Consequently,
the Indigenous people refused to comply with evacuation
orders. As a result, a “bottom-up,” negotiated arrangement
was developed that satisfied the complex socio-cultural needs
of the target stakeholder community. The answer was as
simple as hanging a sheet inside the aircraft that divided
space into safe and respected compartments (Veland et al.,
2010).
Examples like the one just described show how when
policies and procedures are negotiated from the bottom-
up they are owned by the communities to which they are
targeted. More often than not, they are successful. The reverse
is also the case and policy failure frequently occurs due to
poor community consultation. If we consider that antibiotic
resistance is a slow-onset disaster then to prevent future policy
failures around antibiotic prescription and use, consultation
with diverse communities and tailoring solutions specific to
those communities will be crucial. For example, education
programs about antibiotic use may need to be tailored to specific
communities socio-cultural and behavioral contexts, and in
languages other than English, since the factors driving antibiotic
demand are likely to be diverse.
Another key defining element of the ERMP is that emphasis
is placed on empowering individuals, families, communities or
any other stakeholder, to take responsibility for the risks they
face. In this context, once again, the emergency management
approach offers a novel perspective where rather than having
governments and health professionals take full responsibility, the
general public will need to take personal responsibility for the
risk they face from antibiotic resistance—once of course they
understand that risk and their own role in enabling, or limiting
that risk. Microbiologists understand that selection pressure
from antibiotic overuse results in increased resistance and that
minimizing use is crucial to slowing down the rate of resistance
spread. However, how to implement this change in stakeholders
is the challenge. Antibiotic resistance is not just a microbial
problem—it is also a socio-cultural and behavioral problem. In
the context of the issue of the emergence of antibiotic resistance
and its effect on the risk profile of epidemics and pandemics, poor
stakeholder risk perception underpins inappropriate behaviors,
such as patients pressuring clinicians by demanding antibiotics
for viral infections, or patients’ non-adherence to courses of
antibiotics (Michael et al., 2014). Importantly, lacking is a
comprehensive understanding of how different stakeholders
perceive antibiotics, particularly the problem of antibiotic
resistance (Radyowijati and Haak, 2003; Norris et al., 2013;
Hu and Wang, 2015). A thorough understanding of these
factors is necessary to guide the development of effective
stakeholder education programs and strategies, and thereby
reduce risk and increase resilience to the risk of antibiotic
resistance and resistant infections. Apart from preserving current
antibiotics, modifying behavior will help preserve future drugs
for which substantial resources have been and will be invested.
Consequently, missing from the ERMP is crucial data to
assess the risk and to synthesize strategies to manage the
risk. The implications for governments and their agencies for
managing the disaster risk of epidemics and pandemics is
problematic.
The academic and practitioner fields of disaster risk
management have developed an extensive body of literature
on how poor or low stakeholder perceptions of risks and
disasters led to inapproriate and poor behavior (Bird, 2009;
Hoppner et al., 2012). Determining why stakeholders have the
risk perceptions they do is not difficult to investigate. In fact,
since the middle of the 20th century an entire field of research
has evolved to explore risk perception and risk behavior that
has fractured in to several distinct schools of thought (e.g., the
psychometric, the socio-cultural, and the social amplification of
risk schools). Risk managers, together with hazard perception
experts, play a critical role here. Experienced in investigating why
communities behave the way they do, and hold the views and
perceptions of risks that they do, and in communicating complex
risk information to different stakeholders, risk management
can help (Wolf and Moser, 2011; van der Linden, 2015). A
variety of theoretical models are available that explore cognitive,
psychological, behavioral and socio-cultural factors that influence
risk perception and behavioral adjustment and these have been
robustly tested in multiple hazard contexts. For an excellent
summary of these, see the seminal work of Paul Slovic and the
references therein (Slovic, 2000).
In light of this, we propose shifting the discourse to one
of increased multiple stakeholder engagement and awareness,
thereby rebranding of the issue of antibiotic resistance away
from one exclusively of “general health, medicine, and molecular
microbiology” to one of “disaster risk reduction” (Dominey-
Howes et al., 2014). It is our perspective that the slow-onset
emergence of antibiotic resistance is, in fact, a risk that ought
to be framed as a disaster risk management problem—much
like that of slow-onset climate change. Consequently, we call for
the emergency management community, and socio-behavioral
experts in risk perception, to recognize the threat that the
emergence of antibiotic resistance presents both generally, and
to treating the risk of bacterial epidemics and pandemics
specifically. Further, we seek a cooperative partnership with the
medical and health and molecular microbiology communities
to address this problem—traditionally within their domain—as
a wider interdisciplinary research and policy problem. To that
end, a number of initial actions might include (1) establishing
an International Panel on Antimicrobial Resistance similar to
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (which was
recently raised by Woolhouse and Farrar (2014); (2) more
international, interdisciplinary conferences and workshops that
bring together health and medical experts with microbiologists
and emergency managers and policy makers to explore
common ground and build mutual understanding and awareness
and (3) traditional medical and microbiological conferences
and workshops focusing on antibiotic resistance hosting
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special sessions dealing exclusively with community knowledge
and engagement, risk management and policy in order to
broaden the perspectives examined. We believe this will both
appropriately raise the profile of antibiotic resistance in the wider
community and provide new ideas and innovations for tackling
the risk.
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